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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MANIFEST NECESSITY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- Mistrial, Manifest Necessity, and the
Mississippi Standard-Jones v. State, 398 So. 2d 1312 (Miss.
1981).
I.
Howard Jones was indicted on a charge of aggravated assault,
and his first trial began on September 7, 1979. Several law en-
forcement officers were called as prosecution witnesses and
testified that Jones was given the standard Miranda warning prior
to questioning. Following this testimony the prosecution introduced
a tape recording of Jones' alleged confession. However, the first
statement on the tape was a request by Jones for an attorney. The
defense counsel immediately objected and the court declared a
recess. Out of the presence of the jury it was learned that there
were two tapes and the prosecution had played the wrong one.
The court and both attorneys retired to chambers and heard each
tape. Afterwards, the court recalled the jury and announced that
the confession would be excluded because the evidence was ap-
parently obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights. At this point the prosecution moved for a mistrial. The
court granted this motion and the jury was dismissed. The defen-
dant did not object.
The second trial began on March 6, 1980. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging double jeopardy. This
motion was denied. At trial the defendant was convicted and
received a fifteen year sentence.
On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the lower
court decision and discharged the defendant. In so doing, the court
announced a new rule which states that "jeopardy attaches at the
moment the trial jury is selected and sworn to try the case."'
In reaching this decision the court was called upon to decide
two important issues. The first was whether jeopardy had at-
tached when the state moved for a mistrial. The court, by answer-
ing in the affirmative, abandoned a long-standing line of Mississip-
pi cases' and chose to follow the federal rule.3 Prior to this case,
1. Jones v. State, 398 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Miss. 1981).
2. Bounds v. State, 271 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1973); State v. Pace, 210 Miss. 448, 49 So.
2d 710 (1951); Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265 (1926); Lovern v. State, 140 Miss.
635, 105 So. 759 (1925); Price v. State, 36 Miss. 531 (1858); State v. Moor, I Miss. 134 (1
Walker) (1823).
3. This rule was announced in Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
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the rule in Mississippi stated that jeopardy could only attach after
a verdict had been rendered.'
The second issue the court decided was whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion for a
mistrial. Again the court answered in the affirmative, relying on
the doctrine of manifest necessity first announced in United States
v. Perez.' This doctrine allows a retrial after mistrial if there was
a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial.
BACKGROUND
At common law jeopardy did not attach until a verdict was
rendered. If a defendant believed that he had been subjected to
double jeopardy, he could enter one of two pleas. The first,
autrefois acquit, disallowed the retrial of a defendant who had
been acquitted. The second, autrefois convict, disallowed retrial
after a prior conviction for the same offense.'
The courts in the United States followed the common law
rule until 1824 when the court recognized in Perez that there were
occasions when jeopardy might attach before a jury reached a
verdict.7 However, it was not until 1963 in Downum v. United
States' that the Supreme Court explicitly stated that jeopardy at-
tached when the jury was sworn.9
In 1969 the Supreme Court decided Benton v. Maryland"° and
held that the protections of the fifth amendment were applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." Illinois v. Somerville" in 1973, as well as Crist v.
Bretz" in 1977 reaffirmed the Benton rule, which is a command
to the states to apply the federal rule in double jeopardy questions. 4
4. Miss. CONST. art. III, § 22.
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
6. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 329-30 (1769); C.
WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS
482 (1980).
7. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
8. 372 U.S. 734 (1963). It had been recognized prior to Downum that jeopardy attached
before a verdict was reached. However, the exact moment was not specified.
9. In bench trials jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn. Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377 (1975).
10. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
11. Id. at 794. Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), a case which
held that Fifth Amendment protections were not applicable to the states.
12. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
13. 437 U.S. 28 (1977).
14. "[T]he double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental
ideal in our constitutional heritage . . . [Ilt should apply to the States . . - ." 395 U.S. at 794.
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TRACING THE Mississippi RULE
The Mississippi Supreme Court's analysis of the fifth amend-
ment to the federal constitution has followed a different channel.
In 1923, in State v. Moor," the supreme court first interpreted
the double jeopardy clause and held that jeopardy could never
attach until the jury had rendered a verdict. 6
In 1969 Mississippi redrafted the state constitution and rear-
ranged the double jeopardy clause to read that "no person's life
or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense."'
Although the legislature changed the order of the words, the mean-
ing and effect of the clause was unchanged. The court recog-
nized this but chose to follow a different course in Teat v. State"
where they held that a party is placed in jeopardy whenever, upon
a valid indictment, in a court of competent jurisdiction and before
a legally constituted jury, his trial had been fairly entered upon. "9
This decision was reinforced in Helm v. State" where the court,
using essentially the same language, stated that jeopardy at-
tached when the trial has been fairly commenced. " Although these
terms do not pinpoint the actual moment when jeopardy attaches,
it does indicate a marked change from the Moor standard."
These cases have proved to be forerunners of the decision
in Jones. However, less than one year after the Helm decision,
a new constitution was drafted which destroyed their preceden-
tial value. The double jeopardy provision was expanded to in-
clude the requirement of "an actual acquittal or conviction on the
merits to bar another prosecution."" The court had strictly adhered
to this requirement until the Jones decision.
TRACING THE FEDERAL RULE
In certain situations trials end before there is a final adjudica-
tion of the criminal defendants. The overwhelming majority of
these cases end in a mistrial. Mistrials are granted when a jury
15. 1 Miss. 134 (1 Walker) (1823).
16. Id. at 139.
17. Miss. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 5. Ths provision changed the original 1817 constitu-
tional provision which read "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 13.
18. 53 Miss. 439 (1876).
19. Id. at 453. (emphasis added).
20. 66 Miss. 537, 6 So. 322 (1889).
21. Id. at 547, 6 So. at 324.
22. Jeopardy now attached before the jury rendered a verdict. 1 Miss. (I Walker) 134 (1823).
23. Miss. CONST., art. III, § 22.
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is unable to reach a verdict,2 ' when there is evidence of prosecu-
tional or judicial overreaching," or when it is learned that a
member of the jury is prejudiced."'
The first case to address the issue of whether double jeopar-
dy attached to bar retrial was United States v. Perez." A mistrial
occurred because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict.
The court announced that the double jeopardy clause did not bar
retrial of the defendant if there was a "manifest necessity" for the
granting of the mistrial.28
The manifest necessity doctrine is not a rule; rather, it is a
standard which trial judges must apply to determine whether an
occurrence at trial had prejudiced the defendant so severely as
to merit the granting of a mistrial. The court came closest to defin-
ing the doctrine in Arizona v. Washington,"' where speaking
through Justice Stevens the court said:
The words "manifest necessity" appropriately characterized the magnitude of the
prosecutor's burden .... Mt is manifest that the key word necessity cannot
be interpreted literally; instead ... we assume that there are degrees of necessity
and we require a "high degree" before concluding a mistrial is appropriate.'
The trial court's decision in granting a mistrial is a weighted
one. On one hand there is the defendant's valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal.31 Why is this impor-
tant? There are several factors to be considered. First, there is
the financial and emotional burden placed on the defendant by
repeated trials. Second, by allowing the prosecution another chance
in a second trial, the risk is enhanced that an innocent defendant
may be convicted. Retrials after mistrials often take place several
months or even years after the original trial. In that time witnesses
may forget minute facts that could be extremely important to the
24. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579 (1824).
25. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
26. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Some legal writers have argued that Perez was not a
constitutional case because at the time it was decided, jeopardy did not attach until the verdict
was entered. Since the trial ended in a "hung jury," the defendant was not subjected to double
jeopardy. Crist v. Bretz rebutted this argument saying that Perez need not be read as a constitu-
tional case, but the court "summarily dismissed the possibility that Perez was decided on different
grounds." Crist, 437 U.S. 28, 34 n. 10 (1977). See Findlater, Retrial After a Hung Jury: The
Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 701 (1981); 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272 (1964).
28. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580-81 (1824).
29. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
30. Id. at 505
31. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 at 466 (1973); United States v. Join, 400 U.S.
470 at 485,486 (1971); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 at 187-88 (1957); Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 at 689 (1949).
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defendant's case. Even slight shifts in a witness's account of the
facts might draw the line between a verdict of guilt or innocence
for the defendant. 2
On the opposing end of the trial court's balance is the public's
interest in a fair trial designed to end in a just judgment. In Wade
v. Hunter"3 the court held that "a trial can be discontinued when
particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing and
when failure to discontinue would defeat the end of justice."34
The factor that tempers the balance is the role of the trial judge
in granting or refusing to grant a mistrial. Perez established the
sound exercise of discretion standard to aid trial courts in their
decision. Here Justice Story, in an oft-quoted passage, speaking
of the trial courts, said:
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to
define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be
sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, ... afterall, they
have the right to order the discharge [of the accused]; and the security which
the public has for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discre-
tion, rests... upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of office."
The Supreme Court has never established "bright line" rules
to determine when there is a manifest necessity for a trial court
to declare a mistrial. In fact the court has declined at every occa-
sion to set such rigid rules. 6 By giving the trial court discretion
to grant the mistrial balanced by the rights of the defendant and
the public's interest in just judgments, the court has a standard
which is flexible and adaptable to all situations.' Although there
are no mechanical rules that must be mandatorily applied, some
liberal guidelines have been established through a series of
Supreme Court cases. 8
32. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 at 187-88 (1957); Carsey v. United States,
392 F.2d 810, 813-814 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Carsey the defendant was charged with the murder
of his wife. A witness testified in the first trial that defendant and his wife had been acting like
honeymooners. By the time the fourth trial began the witness' testimony had changed to describe
their words as "firm, and possibly cross." 392 F.2d at 813.
33. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
34. Id. at 690.
35. 2 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
36. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 at 486. These rules would "only disserve the
vital competing interest of the Government and the defendant." Id.
37. Id.
38. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
Jorn v. United States, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963);
Gon v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Lovato v. State of New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916);
Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
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Simmons v. United States 9 was one of the earliest cases in
which the court applied the Perez manifest necessity standard.
After the jury had been sworn, the prosecution was informed that
one of the jurors had previously lived with the defendant. Although
the defendant denied this, the court believed there were sufficient
grounds for a mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed this deci-
sion and said,
There can be no condition of things in which the necessity for the exercise of
this power [to grant a mistrial] is more manifest ... than when ... the jurors
or any one of them is subject to such bias or prejudice as not to stand impartial
between the government and the accused.'"
In Logan v. United States" a trial judge granted a motion for
mistrial over the objections of the defendant after jurors deliberated
for forty hours without reaching a verdict. The Supreme Court,
echoing Perez and Simmons, held that any question of granting
a mistrial must be finally decided by the presiding judge in the
"sound exercise of his discretion."' 2 Because it was obvious that
any further attempts to reach a verdict were futile, the judge acted
correctly in granting the mistrial.
In Thompson v. United States43 and Lovato v. New Mexico"
the respective trial courts were faced with the options of proceeding
with the trial and facing certain reversal on appeal because of pro-
cedural errors, or declaring a mistrial. 5 In each case the Supreme
Court held that the ends of public justice would be defeated if
the trial courts were not allowed to correct procedural im-
proprieties as they occurred.46
The manifest necessity doctrine took an interesting turn in
1961 in Gori v. United States. 7 Here the trial court declared a
mistrial on its own motion after the prosecuting attorney began
questioning a witness in an effort to bring into evidence other
39. 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
40. Id. at 154.
41. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
42. Id. at 298 (relying on Perez).
43. 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
44. 242 U.S. 199 (1916).
45. In Thompson one witness had been questioned when it came to the court's attention that
one of the jurors should be disqualified because he had been a member of the grand jury that
indicted the defendant. In Lovato, the defendant first pled not guilty, then demurred to the indict-
ment alleging that it charged no offense. The demurrer was overruled and the case went to trial.
The prosecutor moved for a mistrial because the defendant had not been arraigned after the demurrer
was overruled. The defendant again pled not guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed the subsequent
conviction because the error was "a mere irregularity of procedure which de-
prived him of no right." 242 U.S. at 201.
46. Thompson, 155 U.S. at 274; Lovato, 242 U.S. at 202.
47. 367 U.S. 367 (1961).
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crimes committed by the defendant. Despite this misbehavior by
the attorney, the Court allowed a retrial of the defendant, because
the trial court was acting in the sole interest of the defendant."
The Court went further to say that the decision was "neither ap-
parently justified nor clearly erroneous" and since trial courts are
granted broad discretion under Perez, a retrial would not be barred.
In Downum v. United States" a jury was empanelled in the
morning and told to return in the afternoon for trial. When the
jury returned, the prosecutor moved for a mistrial because a key
witness failed to appear. The defendant's motion for a continuance
was denied and the jury was discharged. The Supreme Court over-
turned the defendant's subsequent conviction because there was
no manifest necessity for a mistrial.
Here the court had an outlet before granting a mistrial. Had
it instead granted a continuance, the prosecution would have had
an opportunity to subpeona the missing witness.
United States v. Jorn5° followed the decision in Downum. This
case involved an income tax preparer who had fraudently prepared
returns for several clients. The prosecution called as witnesses
five taxpayers whose returns were completed by the defendant.
The court refused to allow the witnesses to testify because it was
not convinced that they had been adequately warned of the con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination. The court abruptly
discharged the jury. The Supreme Court, in disallowing a retrial
held that "it seems abundantly apparent that the trial judge made
no effort to exercise a sound discretion to assure that, taking all
circumstances into account, there was a manifest necessity for
a sua sponte declaration of this mistrial." 1
Once again the trial court had an alternative to the granting
of a mistrial. A continuance would have allowed the five witnesses
an opportunity to contact their own attorneys and determine
whether it would be in their own best interest to testify.
In Illinois v. Somerville 2 the trial court had no outlet before
granting a mistrial. The indictment charging the defendant with
theft was defective because it failed to allege a key element of
the offense charged: intent to permanently deprive the owner of
48. Id. at 369-370. See Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "Under
the doctrine of necessity, misbehavior by defense counsel that intrudes on a fair trial permits a
mistrial without prejudice to a retrial." Id. at 818.
49. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
50. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
51. Id. at 487.
52. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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his property. Under Illinois law the indictment could not be amend-
ed to cure the defect. The Supreme Court reversed a Seventh Cir-
cuit decision and held that the test of manifest necessity had been
met because the trial judge had no option except to grant a mistrial.
Here the court used a balancing test and held that "the defendant's,
interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing
and equally legitimate demand for public justice.""3
It is interesting to note that misconduct by the defense counsel
will not bar retrial if the attorney's conduct was the reason for
the mistrial. " In Dinitz v. United States55 the trial court expelled
the defendant's attorney after he had failed to follow the court's
direction to limit his opening statement of the facts to what would
be proved by the testimony. The court gave the defendant, a law
student, the option of proceeding with the trial or moving for a
mistrial. The defendant chose the latter. The Fifth Circuit held
that retrial was barred."6 However, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the trial court's banishment was not done in bad faith
because the attorney was guilty of improper conduct.57 The court
did not address this alternative, but the defendant in effect
waived any claim of double jeopardy by requesting the mistrial.
In Arizona v. Washington8 the Arizona Supreme Court
granted the defendant a new trial when it was learned that the
prosecution had suppressed exculpatory evidence. When the
defense counsel made mention of the fact in his opening state-
ment, the prosecution moved for a mistrial alleging that the state-
ment had prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court allowed the
retrial and held:
In a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not "necessary." Nevertheless,
the overriding interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires
that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation
of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been
affected by the improper comment. 9
THE STATUS OF Gori
In light of these subsequent decisions, it is important to deter-
mine their effect on Gori. The plurality in Jorn seemed to allow
a trial court greater discretion and to hold that there is a greater
53. Id. at 471.
54. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Dinitz v. United States, 424 U.S.
600 (1976).
55. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
56. See United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53 (1974).
57. 424 U.S. at 611.
58. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
59. Id. at 511.
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manifest necessity when the court is protecting the rights of the
defendant as opposed to the rights of a witness.6" Justice Stewart,
dissenting in Jorn, called the decision "flatly inconsistent" with
Gori.61 He went further to say the abuse of discretion standard
relied on by the plurality was insufficient to meet the Gori
balance."2 The test is not an abuse of discretion but an abuse of
the trial process."'
From this opinion there appear to be two approaches to the
status of Gori. Upon a realistic reading of the Jorn plurality it
appears that Gori has been undercut by these decisions. Alter-
natively, it is possible that Gori still stands but is only applicable
in limited areas. In the future it is likely that the Court will blend
Gori with new cases in an effort to establish a more certain
standard.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
As previously mentioned, a request by the defendant for a
mistrial will act as a waiver of the double jeopardy claim.6 ' This
is generally true unless there are other circumstances. In Oregon
v. Kennedy"' the Court clarified a misunderstanding of the pro-
secutorial or judicial "overreaching standard." 6 The newly an-
nounced test is based on the intent of the prosecutor. The
determinative factor is whether any statement or action taken by
the prosecutor was done to provoke the defendant into requesting
a mistrial. 7
A more interesting situation occurs when the defendant does
not object to the granting of a mistrial. Does this mean that he
consents to a retrial? In Jones, the Supreme Court said no.68 The
court offered two reasons for this decision. First, the trial court
could have allowed an objection by the defense counsel had it any
60. 400 U.S. at 482.
61. Id. at 491.
62. Id. at 493.
63. Id. at 492.
64. See United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971).
65. 456 U.S. 667, (1982).
66. "Because of the confusion which these varying statements of the standard in question
have occasioned in other Courts, we deem it best to acknowledge the confusion and its justifiabili-
ty . . . ." 456 U.S. 667.
67. "[W]e do hold that the circumstances under which such a defendant may invoke the bar
of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct
giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into
moving for a mistrial." 456 U.S. 667.
68. 398 So. 2d at 1318.
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intention of sustaining it."9 Second, the court held that the "defen-
dant isn't required to object to avail himself of the constitutional
privilege against being prosecuted twice." 7' The court went fur-
ther to say that certain gray areas exist here.71 This raises several
questions. By adhering to the first argument, wouldn't this, in ef-
fect, amount to a sua sponte declaration of a mistrial and bar retrial
under Jorn? Wouldn't this eradicate the second argument? Or is
it necessary for the defendant to object at all when there is a
manifest necessity for the mistrial?
In conclusion, the decision in Jones was necessary to com-
ply with the federal mandate of Crist. By changing the attach-
ment rule, Mississippi is in line with the constitutional standard.
Jeopardy now attaches when the jury is sworn. Generally, a
mistrial will bar retrial of a criminal defendant unless there ex-
ists a manifest necessity for the mistrial. If the defendant requests
the mistrial, he is said to have waived any double jeopardy claim.
However, if a mistrial occurs for other reasons, the manifest
necessity standard must be applied to determine if the retrial is
barred.
Although this decision is in conflict with the constitutional
provision, it is a necessity to update and modernize the Mississippi
standard.
Marcia Davis
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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